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Women, Peace and Security After Europe’s ‘Refugee Crisis’ 
Aiko Holvikivi and Audrey Reeves 
 
Since its inception in 2000, the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda has 
conceptualized the conflict-affected woman as a subject worthy of international 
attention, protection, and inclusion. In the wake of Europe’s ‘refugee crisis’, this article 
examines how the remit of WPS has broadened from women in conflict zones to refugees 
in Europe’s borderlands. A minority of European states now attend, in their WPS policy, 
to these conflict-affected women on the move. This inclusion productively challenges 
established notions of where conflict-affectedness is located. It exposes Europe as not 
always peaceful and safe for women, especially refugees who flee war. Conversely, the 
dominant tendency to exclude refugees from European WPS policy is built on a fantasy 
of Europe as peaceful and secure for women, which legitimizes the fortressing of Europe 
and obscures European states’ complicity in fueling insecurity at their borders, 
cultivating an ethos of coloniality around the WPS agenda. The inclusion of refugees is 
no panacea to these problems. If focused solely on protection, it repositions European 
states as protective heroes and conflict-affected women as helpless victims. The WPS 
framework nonetheless emphasizes conflict-affected women’s participation in decision-
making and conflict prevention, opening space for recognizing the refugee women as 
political actors.  
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We call on the Security Council and all UN Member States to use a gender lens to 
address the challenges faced by women who have been forcibly displaced … and to 
recommit to working towards the full implementation of the Women, Peace and 
Security agenda.  
Suaad Allami on behalf of the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, 
28 October 2014 
 
On 28 October 2014, Suaad Allami, a prominent women’s rights activist from Iraq, 
addressed the United Nations (UN) Security Council and representatives of UN Member 
States on the challenges faced by women whose lives are uprooted as a consequence of 
armed conflict. Allami’s intervention took place in the context of the Security Council’s 
annual open debate on Women, Peace and Security.1 Every year, an open debate marks 
the anniversary of the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, 
Peace and Security (WPS) in October 2000. The latter marked a watershed moment in 
women’s struggle for better inclusion and representation in matters relating to 
international conflict and peace. Remarkably, Resolution 1325 successfully drew 
 
1 United Nations, ’Transcript of Security Council Open Debate on Women, Peace and Security 28 
October 2014’, available at: {http://www.peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/wpsdebateoctober2014.pdf} 
accessed 23 January 2020. 
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international attention to the conflict-affected woman as a subject worthy of attention, 
inclusion and protection in matters of peace and security.2 Of course, women’s 
organisations had long voiced demands for inclusion in peace and security decision-
making in the realm of women’s peace activism. The UN Security Council’s recognition 
of those demands lent them ‘symbolic capital’ – gravitas and seriousness.3 This spurred 
the development of the WPS agenda: a dynamic, fast-growing, and globalizing 
ecosystem of national and international legislation, policies, and advocacy efforts.4 As 
of January 2020, the WPS agenda includes nine further Security Council resolutions; 
dedicated action plans developed by regional organizations such as NATO, the EU, and 
83 national governments; programmes administered by UN Women and other 
international agencies; and innumerable interventions by civil society actors who debate 
these policies, implement their mandates, and monitor implementation.5 Various actors, 
ranging from Hillary Clinton in her capacity as US Secretary of State, Michelle Bachelet 
as Executive Director of UN Women, Anders Fogh Rasmussen as NATO Secretary 
 
2 Sam Cook, ‘The “woman‐in‐conflict” at the UN Security Council: A subject of practice’, International 
Affairs, 92:2 (2016), pp. 353-72. 
3 Dianne Otto, ‘The Security Council’s alliance of gender legitimacy: The symbolic capital of Resolution 
1325,’ in Hilary Charlesworth and Jean-Marc Coicaud (eds), Fault Lines of International Legitimacy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 239-75. 
4 ʼFunmi Olonisakin and Karen Barnes, ‘Introduction,’ in ʼFunmi Olonisakin, Karen Barnes, and Eka 
Ikpe (eds), Women, Peace and Security: Translating Policy into Practice (New York: Routledge, 2011), 
pp. 3-14, p.7. 
5 WILPF, ’Member States’, available at: {http://peacewomen.org/member-states} accessed 16 March 
2020; Carol Cohn, ‘Mainstreaming gender in UN security policy: A path to political transformation?,’ in 
Shirin Rai and Georgina Waylen (eds), Global Governance: Feminist Perspectives (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 185-206.  
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General, UN Special Envoy Angelina Jolie, and many others, convincingly established 
connections between women, peace and security as relevant to the business of ‘serious’ 
international security – an unprecedented success.6 
As the WPS agenda grew, and interventions multiplied around the world to better address 
the needs of the conflict-affected woman, it drew on and constructed an archetypical 
figure of this woman as located in the conflict zone - the woman-in-conflict. This 
archetype derives in part from interventions by activists like Allami, selected by the NGO 
Working Group on Women, Peace and Security to address the UN Security Council 
during annual open debates on WPS.7 This archetype has three features. First, she has 
national origins in a country conventionally understood as in conflict, or emerging from 
it. For instance, Allami is originally from Iraq. As the WPS agenda emerges out of the 
Security Council, the notion of what counts as a conflict-affected country derives from 
those political contexts ‘officially “on the agenda” of the Council’.8 This has led the NGO 
Working Group on WPS to select speakers who, like Allami, are from countries that the 
five permanent members of the Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States) agree to recognize as in conflict and eligible for international 
 
6 Cynthia Enloe, Seriously! Investigating crashes and crises as if women mattered (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2013), p.9. 
7 Sheri Lynn Gibbings, ‘No angry women at the United Nations: Political dreams and the cultural politics 
of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325’, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 13:4 
(2011), pp. 522-38. 
8 Cook, ‘The “woman-in-conflict”’, p.365. 
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interventions such as peace missions. Since 2003, this includes Iraq, where the UN has 
an ongoing mission (UNAMI), as well as a majority of countries in sub-Saharan Africa.9 
Second, this archetypical woman-in-conflict has directly witnessed and endured the 
deleterious effects of armed violence in her native country.10 For instance, Allami spoke 
of witnessing ‘how displaced women and girls are affected when they are forced to flee’ 
in the context of her daily work at the Women for Progress Center in Baghdad.11 Third, 
the conflict-affected woman as she is imagined in the WPS context is statically located 
in the conflict zone. The posited congruency between the speaker’s national origins, her 
lived experience of conflict, and her current place of dwelling has been a recurrent feature 
of speeches delivered by women civil society leaders at Security Council open debates, 
in spite of the fact that these women often have experiences of international mobility.12 
Allami, for instance, pursued graduate studies in the United States. Her speech did not 
mention this, emphasizing instead her lived experience of war in Iraq. Even as she evoked 
forced displacement, Allami embodied this woman-in-conflict. 
Suaad Allami’s presence as a speaker thus reproduced an established representation of 
the conflict-affected woman, and yet, her statement broke with tradition by drawing 
Member States’ attention to the condition of women and girls forcibly displaced by war. 
 
9 Gibbings, ‘No angry women’. 
10 Cook, ‘The “woman-in-conflict”’, p.365. 
11 United Nations, ‘Transcript’, p.8. 
12 Cook, ‘The “woman-in-conflict”’. 
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Her intervention carved space for what this article argues is an emerging but contested 
inclusion of a new figure, the conflict-affected woman on the move, within advocacy and 
policy on WPS. This inclusion marks a break from tradition in the WPS agenda. The UN 
Security Council Resolutions on WPS include few provisions on the protection of 
forcibly displaced women and girls. These provisions only place obligations on UN 
agencies, governmental bodies, and armed groups operating in countries where an armed 
conflict is taking place – following the Council’s narrow understanding of the term.13 
Partly for this reason, the WPS agenda has so far paid limited attention to the conflict-
affected woman who moves away from such conventionally defined conflict zones. 
Writing in the wake of Europe’s so-called refugee crisis, we document the emergent 
inclusion of the conflict-affected woman on the move in WPS policy and, to a lesser 
extent, activism. This inclusion, we suggest, challenges established notions of conflict-
affectedness, of security, and of imagined distinctions between a peaceful Europe and a 
conflict-ridden Global South.  
Conversely, some European states’ reluctance to address forced displacement at their 
borders as a WPS concern contributes to the fortressing of Europe. The common notion 
that European WPS policy should be focused on foreign policy only, and therefore 
 
13 Aiko Holvikivi and Audrey Reeves, "The WPS Agenda and the ‘Refugee Crisis’: Missing Connections 
and Missed Opportunities in Europe," Laura Shepherd and Paul Kirby eds. LSE Centre for Women, 
Peace and Security Working Paper Series, LSE, 2017, available at: 
{http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/wps/2017/06/26/the-wps-agenda-and-the-refugee-crisis-missing-connections-and-
missed-opportunities-in-europe-aiko-holvikivi-and-audrey-reeves-62017/} accessed 6 September 2017.  
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exclude questions of asylum, reveals the colonial underbelly of the WPS agenda. It draws 
on, and reproduces, the twin assumptions that insecurity resides outside of Europe, and 
that conflict-affected women do not need to be empowered vis-à-vis European states.14 
These assumptions, implicit in refugee-blind WPS policy, support the hardening of 
European borders by naturalizing an imagined hierarchical difference between a safe 
Europe and an unsafe extra-European space. The entrenchment of this projected 
distinction obscures Europe’s multiple connections to the broader world, and its 
complicity in fueling conflicts globally. In addition, the material hardening of European 
borders limits access to asylum, thus constricting survival options for conflict-affected 
women on the move. This two-pronged argument – that WPS policy unsettles colonial 
structures when it is refugee-aware, and reinforces them when it is refugee-blind – 
contributes to feminist security scholarship that examines how the WPS agenda interprets 
and addresses the needs and rights of conflict-affected women.15 It also highlights 
 
14 Swati Parashar, ‘The WPS Agenda: A postcolonial critique,’ in Sara E. Davies and Jacqui True (eds), 
The Oxford Handbook of Women, Peace, and Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 829-
39; Nicola Pratt, ‘Reconceptualising gender, reinscribing racial-sexual boundaries in international 
security: The case of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on “Women, Peace and Security”’, 
International Studies Quarterly, 57:4 (2013), pp. 772-83. 
15 Soumita Basu, ‘Gender as national interest at the UN Security Council’, International Affairs, 92:2 
(2016), pp. 255-73; Cohn, ‘Mainstreaming gender.’; ʼFunmi Olonisakin, Karen Barnes, and Eka Ikpe, 
Women, peace and security: translating policy into practice (Abingdon, New York: Routledge, 2011); 
Paul Kirby and Laura J. Shepherd, ‘The futures past of the Women, Peace and Security agenda’, 
International Affairs, 92:2 (2016), pp. 373-92; Maria Martin de Almagro and Caitlin Ryan, ‘Subverting 
economic empowerment: Towards a postcolonial-feminist framework on gender (in)securities in post-
war settings’, European Journal of International Relations, 25:4 (2019), pp. 1059-79; Audrey Reeves, 
‘Feminist Knowledge and Emerging Governmentality in UN Peacekeeping’, International Feminist 
Journal of Politics, 14:3 (2012), pp. 348-69. 
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entanglements of gender, race, and place in European policy-making that will be of 
interest to critical literature on migration and European identity.16 
The article progresses as follows. First, we conceptualize the conflict-affected woman on 
the move as she is emerging as a new subject of concern for the WPS agenda. Second, 
we introduce the methodology through which we map this emergence, with an emphasis 
on European national action plans (NAPs) on WPS, where she remains a marginal 
presence. Third, we consider the logics according to which conflict-affected women on 
the move to Europe are sometimes included as objects of WPS policy and fourth, those 
according to which they remain excluded in a majority of national contexts and at the 
EU level. We problematize this exclusion on the grounds that it obscures the complicity 
of European states in creating or exacerbating the insecurity of conflict-affected women 
and (re)produces harmful bordering practices. Simultaneously, we show that inclusion is 
no panacea and is typically done in a way that re-establishes the conflict-affected woman 
as a victim in need of European states’ help, with only a few acknowledging her potential 
as a transformative agent. We conclude that exclusion is harmful and must be resisted, 
 
16 David Moffette and Shaira Vadasaria, ‘Uninhibited violence: race and the securitization of 
immigration’, Critical Studies on Security, 4:3 (2016), pp. 291-305; Victoria M. Basham, ‘Liberal 
militarism as insecurity, desire and ambivalence: Gender, race and the everyday geopolitics of war’, 
Security Dialogue, 49:1-2 (2018), pp. 32-43; Harriet Gray and Anja K. Franck, ‘Refugees as/at risk: The 
gendered and racialized underpinnings of securitization in British media narratives’, Security Dialogue, 
50:3 (2019), pp. 275-91; Adrian Little and Nick Vaughan-Williams, ‘Stopping boats, saving lives, 
securing subjects: Humanitarian borders in Europe and Australia’, European Journal of International 
Relations, 23:3 (2016), pp. 533-56. 
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and that the integration of refugees in WPS policies can be beneficially transformative 
to the extent that WPS has a tradition of emphasizing women’s political participation and 
their role in conflict prevention.  
Conflict-affected women on the move: From the conflict zone to the 
militarized borderland 
This is her home 
 this thin edge of 
  barbwire.  
Gloria Anzaldúa17 
Since the beginning of 2015, a rising number of women and girls have attempted a 
perilous and often deadly journey to reach Europe through the sea or surrounding 
countries in the Mediterranean area, contributing to what is referred to in media and 
policy discourses as Europe’s refugee crisis.18 In 2016, the UN Refugee Agency 
 
17
 Gloria Anzaldúa, Borderlands: The New Mestiza = La Frontera, 4th ed. (San Fransisco, CA: Aunt 
Lute Books, 2012), p.35. 
18 Georg Löfflmann and Nick Vaughan-Williams, ‘Vernacular imaginaries of European border security 
among citizens: From walls to information management’, European Journal of International Security, 
3:3 (2018), pp. 382-400; Jane Freedman, Gendering the International Asylum and Refugee Debate, 
Second ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), p.197; Seth M. Holmes and Heide Castañeda, 
‘Representing the “European refugee crisis” in Germany and beyond: Deservingness and difference, life 
and death’, American Ethnologist, 43:1 (2016), pp. 12-24; BBC, ’Europe Migrant Crisis’, available at: 
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estimated that women, together with minors, counted for nearly 60 percent of migrants 
arriving at Europe’s borders, many of whom were forcibly displaced by war.19 While the 
presence of asylum seekers at the borders of Europe is not new, violent conflicts in Syria, 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Eritrea, and Somalia increased the absolute number of forcibly 
displaced people in recent years, the proportion of women amongst them, and overall 
levels of insecurity experienced at the borders of Europe.20 Women experience distinct 
and acute forms of insecurity, and face higher rates of mortality than men.21 Due to the 
closing down of borders, women who attempt to journey towards and across Europe are 
increasingly reliant on smugglers, rendering them more vulnerable to abuse or sexual 
exploitation as payment for their passage.22 For women who make it to reception and 
transit centres, new challenges emerge in the form of rampant gender-based violence 
(GBV), including sexual violence, early and forced marriage, and domestic violence. 
Governmental agencies are often not able to prevent or respond to these gendered forms 
of violence in meaningful ways.23 Police and security forces have, at times, exacerbated 
 
{https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-32395181} accessed 26 November 2018; European 
Commission, ’Refugee Crisis in Europe’, available at: {http://ec.europa.eu/echo/refugee-crisis} accessed 
26 November 2018. 
19 Tania Karas, ‘The women and children turning to Europe’, UNHCR UK, available at: 
{https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2016/3/573c653e4/women-children-turning-europe.html} accessed 
12 January 2019. 
20 Jane Freedman, ‘Engendering security at the borders of Europe: Women migrants and the 
mediterranean “crisis”’, Journal of Refugee Studies, 29:4 (2016), pp. 568-82, p.568. 
21 Pickering and Cochrane 2012 cited in Freedman, ‘Engendering security’, p.570. 
22 Jane Freedman, ‘Sexual and gender-based violence against refugee women: A hidden aspect of the 
refugee "crisis"’, Reproductive Health Matters, 24:47 (2016), pp. 18-26. 
23 UNHCR, UNFPA, and Women’s Refugee Commission, ’Protection Risks for Women and Girls in the 
European Refugee and Migrant Crisis: Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’, 
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conditions of insecurity, as they have committed gender-based violence against displaced 
women, which has been met with little action at national or EU level.24  
The violence and insecurity experienced by forcibly displaced women partly stem from 
serious shortcomings in the implementation of gender-sensitive refugee and asylum 
policies, as reported by scholars and human rights agencies. These include inadequate 
housing conditions at reception centres, particularly insufficient provision of gender-
segregated sleeping, hygiene, and recreation facilities. Thus, when visiting an 
overcrowded refugee reception centre in Greece in the summer of 2018, a group of 
researchers was surprised to discover a pile of discarded water bottles filled with urine.25 
Their guide informed them that asylum-seekers residing in the centre – particularly 
women and girls – were using water bottles as makeshift toilets to avoid leaving their 
tent at night and exposing themselves to kidnapping and sexual assault. While it was 
possible for a woman to ask to be moved to a safe zone, this could only happen once she 
had already experienced violence on site.26 This anecdote points to a broader cluster of 
 
available at: {http://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/resource-
pdf/EuropeMission_Protection_Risks_19_Jan_Final_0.pdf} accessed 29 January 2018, p.7. 
24 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, ’Monthly Data Collection on the Current Migration 
Situation in the EU’, available at: {https://fra.europa.eu/en/theme/asylum-migration-
borders/overviews/focus-gender-based-violence} accessed 23 January 2020. 
25 Amanda Russell Beattie, Patrycja Rozbicka, and Gemma Bird, ‘We must open our eyes to the 
injustices facing child refugees’, HuffPost UK, available at: 
{https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/child-refugees_uk_5b503e8fe4b0fd5c73c24176} accessed 12 
January 2019. 
26 Russell Beattie, Rozbicka, and Bird, ‘We must open our eyes’. 
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problems that cultivate insecurity amongst women refugees, including policies delaying 
or hampering family and spousal reunification; inadequate mechanisms for reporting 
sexual and domestic violence; and an alarming lack of state-led data gathering on gender-
based violence.27 
The reported insecurity of refugee women and girls fleeing conflict suggests that 
prevalent understandings of the conflict-affected woman should be broadened in two 
ways to better attend to the gendered impacts of displacement. First, while WPS policy 
has often attached conflict-affectedness to geographic zones understood as areas marked 
by conflict, this alternative reading suggests that conflict-affectedness also attaches to 
people on the move. This understanding emerges from a place of attention to the long-
term impact of war in the country of origin on women displaced by conflict. As explained 
by Allami in her speech, forced displacement is an important and frequent consequence 
of war for women. Fleeing, while often necessary to escape death, generates intense 
insecurity for displaced populations. It exposes them to the problems of homelessness 
including unreliable and inconsistent access to water and food, shelter from the elements, 
and healthcare, not to mention dangerous travel routes, in environments marked by 
scarcity and uncertainty. 
 
27 Freedman, ‘Sexual and gender-based violence’; European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 
‘Monthly Data Collection’. 
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As Allami mentions, those who flee conflict also carry physical and/or emotional trauma 
from the violence that they have witnessed or experienced,28 a trauma often sustained or 
worsened by the very circumstances of displacement. The physical and psychological 
wounds of war are not necessarily dissipated by migration. They often accompany 
survivors to their new place of dwelling, however remote from the conflict zone. 
Activists addressing a privileged audience, like Allami at the Security Council, will often 
draw on notions of trauma that emphasize the impact of a single event on an individual, 
such as the violent destruction of one’s village. Such notions of trauma nonetheless rely 
on the assumption that people primarily experience life-threatening insecurity during 
punctual events. In contrast, forcibly displaced women experience insecurity on a chronic 
basis. This chronic insecurity is in itself traumatic, as argued by feminists from the Global 
South, for whom event-based notions of trauma are Western-centric. For displaced 
women, the daily struggle for food, water, and safety is often a greater challenge to the 
psyche than isolated events such as rape or the murder of a loved one, however damaging 
on their own terms.29  
Although displaced people of all genders experience intense hardship, gender mediates 
the security risks involved in forced displacement. Travelling alone, or without male kin, 
 
28 United Nations, ‘Transcript’, p.8. 
29 Aisha Fofana Ibrahim, ‘Connecting testimony, trauma, and memory: The Sierra Leone experience’, 
Pacific Coast Philology, 44:2 (2009), pp. 249-71. 
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can be stigmatizing for women in contexts where a woman’s social standing is reliant on 
her ties to a family or kinship group. This stigma in turn can make her vulnerable to 
violence, including sexual violence. This, in turn, can lead to pregnancies at moments 
when women are unlikely to receive appropriate reproductive care. If we take into 
account these various and gendered forms of insecurity involved in women’s experiences 
of conflict-induced forced displacement, we may understand conflict-affectedness as a 
characteristic that attaches itself to bodies and human lives. In this new understanding, 
conflict-affectedness is a condition that extends to women fleeing war to seek refuge 
away from their country of origin, including in countries not traditionally understood as 
in conflict. This would notably include women who have flown conflict and are seeking 
refuge in Europe.  
Second, an attentiveness to the forms of militarized violence at Europe’s borders gives 
cause to reconsider what counts as conflict, and where women are conflict-affected. WPS 
policy typically relies on a conventional notion of conflict as ‘the use of armed force 
between two parties’.30 This notion can however be productively broadened to include 
forms of violence and insecurity experienced by marginalised subjects outside the 
context of ‘war’ conventionally defined.31 In the last decade, Europe has fortressed itself 
 
30 Uppsala Conflict Data Program, ’Definitions’, available at: 
{https://pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/} accessed 2 October 2019. 
31 Tarak Barkawi, ‘Decolonising war’, European Journal of International Security, 1:2 (2016), pp. 199-
214. 
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to wage what some have called a war against immigration.32 European rhetoric on border 
control has become militarised, referring to a combat against a ‘territorial invasion’.33 
The related material militarisation of border regimes has led to what resembles a military 
confrontation, albeit one in which European armed border guards oppose mostly 
unarmed and impoverished migrants who find themselves much more vulnerable to 
injury and death.34 At least 36,570 migrants and refugees died at Europe’s borders 
between 1993 and 201935 and an estimated 8,793 migrants died at sea in 2015-2016 
alone.36 As the vast majority of the deceased come from Africa, the Middle East, and 
Asia, fortress Europe has been described as waging a war marked by ‘the utter 
disposability of black and brown lives’.37 Thus, women who flee Syria, Afghanistan, or 
other war zones and attempt to enter Europe may be understood as doubly affected by 
conflict: in the country of origin and at the border. Conventional notions of conflict as 
temporally contained event or geographically static condition are insufficient to thinking 
seriously about how refugee women are affected by conflict across time and location. In 
 
32 Matthew Carr, Fortress Europe: Inside the War Against Immigration (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2015), 
p.5. 
33 William Walters, ‘Imagined migration world: The European Union’s anti-illegal immigration 
discourse,’ in Martin Geiger and Antoine Pécoud (eds), The Politics of International Migration 
Management (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 73-95. 
34 Carr, Fortress Europe, p.5; Löfflmann and Vaughan-Williams, ‘Vernacular imaginaries’, p.388. 
35 UNITED, ’About the ‘List of Deaths’’, available at: {http://unitedagainstrefugeedeaths.eu/about-the-
campaign/about-the-united-list-of-deaths/} accessed 20 March 2020. 
36 European Parliament, ’EU Migrant Crisis: Facts and Figures’, available at: 
{http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/society/20170629STO78630/eu-migrant-crisis-facts-
and-figures.} accessed 29 January 2018. 
37 Nicholas De Genova, ‘The “migrant crisis” as racial crisis: do Black Lives Matter in Europe?’, Ethnic 
and Racial Studies, 41:10 (2018), pp. 1765-82, p.1779. 
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contrast, thinking about the ‘conflict-affected woman on the move’ affords the 
conceptual flexibility required, and continues broader feminist efforts to rethink what 
counts as ‘war’ and ‘conflict’ from the perspective of women’s lived experiences.38 
Asylum seekers are particularly vulnerable to violence and death because they occupy a 
liminal and insecure space that resembles Gloria Anzaldúa’s description of the 
borderland: ‘a vague and undetermined place … in a constant state of transition. The 
prohibited and forbidden are its inhabitants’.39 This borderland refers not only to their 
geopolitical location at Europe’s borders, it is also produced by the marginality of gender 
to asylum processes. Conflict-affected women remain stuck in the borderland for several 
reasons. Gender-specific forms of vulnerability (such as the threat of sexual assault) are 
often not recognised by gender-blind asylum laws and policies.40 Moreover, in countries 
like the United Kingdom, the closing down of borders involves delays in family 
 
38 Wenona Giles and Jennifer Hyndman, ‘Introduction: Gender and conflict in a global context,’ in 
Wenona Mary Giles and Jennifer Hyndman (eds), Sites of Violence: Gender and Conflict Zones 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004), pp. 3-23, p.6; see also Cynthia Cockburn, ‘The 
continuum of violence: A gender perspective on war and peace,’ in Wenona Mary Giles and Jennifer 
Hyndman (eds), Sites of Violence: Gender and Conflict Zones (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 2004), pp. 24-44; Chris J. Cuomo, ‘War is not just an event: Reflections on the significance of 
everyday violence’, Hypatia, 11:4 (1996), pp. 30-45. 
39 Anzaldúa, Borderlands, p.25. 
40 Jane Freedman, ‘Women Seeking Asylum’, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 10:2 (2008), 
pp. 154-72; Lucy Hall, ‘WPS, Migration, and Displacement,’ in Sara E. Davies and Jacqui True (eds), 
The Oxford Handbook of Women, Peace, and Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 643-
56. 
17 
reunification.41 Many women whose husbands and partners have immigrated are left 
behind if not abandoned, leaving them isolated, impoverished, and more vulnerable to 
violence and exploitation. For these reasons, the conflict-affected woman on the move is 
vulnerable to many forms of violence and trauma. She is akin to Anzaldúa’s border 
woman in the poem that opened this section: on a thin edge of barbwire.  
However, and as many WPS activists and femocrats keenly emphasise, conflict-affected 
women are also creative, ingenious, and agentic human beings who have both the 
capacity and the right to productively contribute to security policy-making – including 
after they flee to a foreign country. In her speech, Allami insisted that ‘women must fully 
participate and be consulted systematically in decision-making, across all displacement 
settings, in humanitarian programming, and, of course, in the broader political, security 
and peace processes’.42 This intervention builds on a well-anchored concern with 
women’s political participation in the WPS context, where women’s rights activists have 
successfully established a representation of the woman-in-conflict ‘as someone who is 
empowered and not simply a victim’.43 Ever since its inception, the WPS agenda has not 
only advocated an increased protection of women’s human rights, but also women’s 
 
41 Amnesty International UK et al., ’Syria Response Consultations on the UK National Action Plan on 
Women, Peace and Security’, available at: {http://gaps-uk.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Syria-NAP-
Consultations-report.pdf} accessed 25 June 2018. 
42 United Nations, ‘Transcript’, p.9., emphasis added 
43 Cook, ‘The “woman-in-conflict”’, p.371; see also Jennifer Thomson, ‘The Women, Peace, and 
Security Agenda and Feminist Institutionalism: A Research Agenda’, International Studies Review, 21:4 
(2018), pp. 598-613. 
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participation in all matters relating to peace and security and the inclusion of women in 
conflict prevention. By pairing protection with participation, the WPS agenda contains 
the demand that women are seen as subjects capable of agency – that is, as subjects able 
to critically reflect and act on their conditions.44 In this sense, the WPS agenda provides 
the grounds for recognising, as feminist theorising on agency insists we should, that 
agency and coercion are not mutually exclusive conditions, but rather exist 
simultaneously, in complex relation to one another.45 Agency can coexist with 
vulnerability and oppression; the need for protection does not substitute the right to 
participation. 
This approach is markedly distinct from existing gender provisions in refugee law, and 
asylum and migration policy, including in the European context. The latter have 
historically exhibited a tendency to depoliticise women by limiting recognition of their 
political agency to that enacted by male relatives.46 Consequently, whenever traditional 
refugee policy and legal texts consider women, it frames them as passive victims. 
Similarly, the European media has often framed women refugees as voiceless and 
 
44 Albeit recognizing that such action may be constrained. See for example, Sumi Madhok, ‘Action, 
agency, coercion: Reformatting agency for oppressive contexts,’ in Sumi Madhok, Anne Phillips, and 
Kalpana Wilson (eds), Gender, Agency, and Coercion (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013), pp. 
102-21; Saba Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2005). 
45 Sumi Madhok, Anne Phillips, and Kalpana Wilson, ‘Introduction,’ in Sumi Madhok, Anne Phillips, 
and Kalpana Wilson (eds), Gender, Agency, and Coercion (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013), pp. 
1-13, p.3; Judith Butler, Undoing Gender (New York, NY: Routledge, 2004), p.3.  
46 Hall, ‘WPS, Migration, and Displacement,’ p.4; see also Freedman, ‘Women Seeking Asylum’. 
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victimized.47 The weight of these cultural representations is such that even after Allami 
had enjoined Member States and leading security organisations to ensure the full 
protection, participation and consultation of women on peace and security matters 
‘across all displacement settings’, the NGO and diplomatic community embraced first 
and foremost the objective of better protecting refugee women.48 Several diplomats 
highlighted actions taken by their country to open up their domestic asylum policies and 
processes, while others reaffirmed the principles of international protection of asylum 
seekers.49 In 2016, the NGO Working Group on WPS requested, on behalf of 253 civil 
society organizations from around the world, that Member States ‘implement effective 
asylum and legal protection mechanisms in accordance with international law; remove 
gender discriminatory nationality laws; and protect women and girls from sexual and 
gender-based violence while in transit and in final destinations’.50 This shows how 
difficult it is even for activists to find language that supports a view of women refugees 
as agentic and worthy of political inclusion – this language simply does not exist in the 
existing legal framework around asylum and refugees.  
 
47 Gray and Franck, ‘Refugees as/at risk’, p.283. 
48 United Nations, ‘Transcript’, p.9. Emphasis added. 
49 United Nations, ‘Transcript’, pp.27, 41-2, 48, 72, 79. 
50 NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security ’Open Letter to Permanent Representatives to 
the UN: Recommendations on the Security Council Open Debate on Women, Peace and Security 
(WPS)’, available at: {http://www.womenpeacesecurity.org/resource/open-letter-unsc-wps-anniversary-
october-2016/} accessed 25 June 2018. 
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In contrast, the WPS agenda’s existing figure of the conflict-affected woman is 
simultaneously vulnerable and agentic. This, we argue, is the key distinctive advantage 
of WPS over migration and asylum policy. In spite of all its imperfections and 
shortcomings at the implementation level, the WPS agenda contains a core commitment 
to recognizing and promoting conflict-affected women’s agency and participation, a 
commitment that may now be extended to conflict-affected on the move. The NGO 
Working Group for WPS accomplished a new push in this direction in 2017, when it 
nominated the Danish activist Mina Jaf to address the Security Council on its behalf. Jaf 
was born a refugee in Iraqi Kurdistan. She came into the world as her mother escaped a 
chemical attack launched on her village in the context of the war between Iran and Iraq. 
When Jaf was 14, her family was granted asylum in Denmark. At the time of her 
allocution, Jaf had grown into a young woman, and the funder and leader of a non-
governmental organisation that supports women refugees and provides gender training 
to personnel who work with refugees in several European countries.51 Jaf’s allocution at 
the Security Council emphasized both victimhood, through the narration of her flight 
from a warzone as a girl, and agency, in the form of her current leadership role in refugee 
action. By making visible women like Jaf, the NGO Working Group on WPS is 
 
51 NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, ’Statement by Ms. Mina Jaf at UN Security 
Council Open Debate on Sexual Violence in Conflict’, available at: 
{https://www.womenpeacesecurity.org/resource/statement-unsc-sexual-violence-open-debate-may-
2017/} accessed 20 March 2020. 
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productively supporting more complex representations of refugee women, and showing 
that they are not only victims but also active political agents.  
Having established the potential benefits of an emergent re-conceptualisation, in WPS 
advocacy, of the conflict-affected woman as also referring to the woman who flees 
conflict and journeys across borders in search of increased safety, we ask, to what extent 
does national WPS policy construct the conflict-affected woman as a transnationally 
mobile subject, and with what effects? Whilst this question is of global relevance, we 
focus our inquiry on Europe. European states are influential actors in the field of WPS, 
in which they often self-present as leaders and role models. For instance, the UK proudly 
boasts a ‘strong domestic and international record on women and girls’ that positions it 
as a ‘global leader’ in the field of WPS and gender equality more generally.52 The Nordic 
states also ‘see themselves as the leaders of the WPS agenda’.53 Finland for instance 
asserts its status as ‘a pioneer and expert of gender equality issues’.54 European states 
articulate this special expertise as enabling them to lead and advise other countries or 
international agencies whom they support in the implementation of the WPS agenda  and 
 
52 Government of the UK, ’UK National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2018 to 2022’, 
available at: {https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-national-action-plan-on-women-peace-
and-security-2018-to-2022} accessed 23 January 2020, p.1. 
53 Jacqui True, ‘Explaining the global diffusion of the Women, Peace and Security agenda’, International 
Political Science Review, 37:3 (2016), pp. 307-23, p.313. 
54 Government of Finland, ’Finland's National Action Plan 2012-2016’, available at: 
{http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/finland_nap_2012.pdf} accessed 23 January 2020, p.11. 
22 
in developing their own action plans.55 Whilst positioning themselves as trendsetters, 
European states have addressed forced displacement in national action plans (NAPs) on 
WPS with uneven levels of enthusiasm and thoroughness. In the UK, academics and 
NGOs were notably unsuccessful in advocating the inclusion of provisions regarding 
facilitated family reunification, expanded resettlement programs, and the sensitization of 
hosting communities in the UK’s most recent NAP.56  
This reluctance exposes a tension between the normative commitment of the WPS 
agenda to protect and include conflict-affected women in matters pertaining to 
international security on the one hand, and the geopolitical imaginaries on which WPS 
policy is built on the other hand. WPS policy frameworks have been ostensibly designed 
to make the needs and concerns of conflict-affected women visible and politically salient 
 
55 Laura J. Shepherd, ‘Making war safe for women? National action plans and the militarisation of the 
Women, Peace and Security agenda’, International Political Science Review, 37:3 (2016), pp. 324-35, 
p.332; see also Rahel Kunz and Julia Maisenbacher, ‘Women in the neighbourhood: Reinstating the 
European Union’s civilising mission on the back of gender equality promotion?’, European Journal of 
International Relations, 23:1 (2015), pp. 122-44. See for example, Government of Finland, ’Women, 
Peace and Security: Finland's national action plan 2018-2021’, available at: 
{http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-952-281-327-5} accessed 23 January 2020, p.59; Government of Belgium, 
’Women, Peace and Security: Belgian National Action Plan on the Implementation of UN Security 
Council Resolution 1325’, available at: 
{http://peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/Belgium%20NAP%201325%202013-2016%20EN.pdf} 
accessed 29 January 2018, p.26; Government of Germany, ’Action Plan of the Government of the 
Federal Republic of Germany on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1325 on Women, Peace and Security for the Period 2017 – 2020’, available at: 
{https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/286988/2462039ccaa1326a195da2e962048596/170111-
aktionsplan-1325-data.pdf} accessed 23 January 2020, p.20. 
56 LSE Centre for Women, Peace and Security ’UK National Action Plan on Women, Peace and 
Security: Consultation Response’, available at: {http://www.lse.ac.uk/women-peace-
security/assets/documents/2017/LSEWPS-UKNAP-2017.pdf} accessed 25 June 2018; Amnesty 
International UK et al., ‘Syria Response’; Government of the UK, ‘NAP 2018-2022’. 
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and European governments have overwhelmingly endorsed those frameworks. Those 
governments are ready to voice support and dedicate resources to protect and include the 
conflict-affect woman when she is in the zone of conflict. Once the same conflict-
affected women moves towards Europe, their support is withdrawn, leading to an 
apparent normative inconsistency. As we interrogate this tension, we, the authors, also 
interrogate our own practices as academics who were once practitioners involved in 
designing and implementing WPS policy in an international foundation based in Europe. 
Conflict-affected women on the move were not, so to say, on our radar back then, and 
this seemed natural. We hereby document new efforts to include displaced women in 
WPS discourse, but also interrogate what the terms of inclusion (and of exclusion) reveal 
about the foundations of this discourse.  
Methodology: Investigating the borderlands of WPS policy  
Our inquiry proceeds through a content and discourse analysis of WPS policy, as 
articulated in NAPs and regional action plans. The content analysis allows us to trace, 
quantitatively, how often questions of forced displacement arise in WPS policy and 
which actors are most likely to include forced displacement as a concern. We worked 
with three datasets: 1) a global dataset of 55 national action plans (assembled in 2016); 
2) a more up to date European dataset of 22 national action plans (assembled in 2018); 
and 3) a global dataset of 5 regional action plans (assembled in 2018). The first dataset, 
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produced by the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), includes all mentions of forced 
displacement found in the 55 NAPs on WPS available in 2016 in English or French. A 
NAP is found to mention forced displacement when it contains any of the following 11 
terms: asylum, displace(d/ment), IDP(s), migrant(s), migration, on the move, refuge(es), 
stateless(ness), flee, border, and returnee.57 These mentions relate to different legal 
migratory categories, but we use the term ‘refugee’ in a generic sense, referring to 
persons seeking refuge.58 As we are especially interested in the content of European 
NAPs, we produced a second, more up to date dataset containing the most recent NAP 
of each European country that ever adopted such a document, i.e. 22 NAPs adopted 
between 2007 and 2018 (see Figure 1). We searched these NAPs for the same 11 
keywords related to forced displacement, thus reproducing the UNHCR approach for a 
more up to date set of NAPs.   
We primarily focus on NAPs because they are commonly regarded as the major 
mechanism of policy diffusion for the WPS agenda, and one which allows us to trace 
how the normative framework on WPS has evolved globally.59 The vast majority of 
NAPs are adopted as government policy. Sometimes a single ministry (typically Foreign 
 
57 UNHCR, ‘National action plans (NAPs) on UNSCRs on Women, Peace and Security: extracts and 
analysis of text on forced displacement and statelessness’,  (Geneva: UNHCR, 2016). 
58 Similarly to Penny Green and Mike Grewcock, ‘The war against illegal immigration: State crime and 
the construction of a European identity’, Current Issues in Criminal Justice, 14:1 (2002), pp. 87-101. 
59 True, ‘Explaining the global diffusion’; Mona Lena Krook and Jacqui True, ‘Rethinking the life cycles 
of international norms: The United Nations and the global promotion of gender equality’, European 
Journal of International Relations, 18:1 (2010), pp. 103-27. 
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Affairs) will be in charge of designing the NAP; sometimes the NAP receives input from 
several ministries (such as Defence, Cooperation and Development, Internal Security, 
and/or Immigration). Parliament will often be consulted either as the NAP is being 
developed, or following its adoption, to provide oversight over its implementation. 
Despite variations from state to state, all NAPs benefit from the authority, influence, and 
resources associated with the state. They give us information about how state agents 
imagine their own identity and follow a similar template that helpfully allows for 
comparison. Like states, regional organisations also adopt action plans on WPS. Our 
third dataset includes action plans of five regional organizations (the EU, NATO, the 
Economic Community of West African States, the Pacific States, and the League of Arab 
States), which allowed us to compare the EU action plan with other regional action plans, 
and check whether tendencies at the state level were also reflected at the regional level.  
Our content analysis started with a keyword search for forced displacement issues in 
datasets 2 (European NAPs 2018) and 3 (Regional Action Plans 2018). We employed 
the same keyword search developed by UNHCR for dataset 1, mentioned above. This 
allowed us to assess, first of all, which nation states and regional organizations attend to 
the conflict-affected woman on the move. Second, for all documents that coded positive 
in this first step, we examined whether they framed forced displacement as a) a domestic 
issue; b) a foreign issue or c) both a foreign and domestic issue. This analysis of WPS 
policy documents provides a quantitative transnational comparison that allows us to map 
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the extent to which Europe includes forced displacement in its WPS policy and whether 
they do in a domestic or foreign policy context, and how it compares to the rest of the 
world (see Figure 2).  
As a proxy for Europe, we use the European Economic Area (EEA) – the 28 EU Member 
States and 4 non-EU members of the European Free Trade Area (Iceland, Lichtenstein, 
Norway, and Switzerland). While defining Europe in this way paradoxically reproduces 
a form of bordering, the EEA is the best proxy as it is productive of the European border 
regime.60 In providing for the free movement of persons, goods, services, and capital 
within the single market, it produces a relaxation of border controls within its area, while 
simultaneously producing a hardening of external borders, thereby constituting what is 
experienced as ‘fortress Europe’ by those who seek to enter it. Since the fortressing of 
borders is also salient in non-European countries such as Australia and the USA, we 
compare trends in Europe thus defined to trends in the Global North. We use membership 
in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)61 as an 
imperfect proxy for distinguishing Global North and Global South countries.  
 
60 Eleonore Kofman and Rosemary Sales, ‘Towards fortress Europe?’, Women's Studies International 
Forum, 15:1 (1992), pp. 29-39. 
61 OECD, also known as 'a club of rich countries', Buttonwood, ‘What is the OECD?’, The Economist, 
available at: {https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2017/07/05/what-is-the-oecd} 
accessed 23 January 2020. 
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We then proceed to a poststructuralist discourse analysis of forced displacement in 
European WPS policy, including dataset 2 and the EU regional action plan. Using 
discourse analysis allows us to map how European WPS policy constructs the conflict-
affected woman on the move, and what logics (or rationales) underlie either her inclusion 
or exclusion from WPS policy frameworks. First, we scrutinize how WPS policy defines 
her as a subject (e.g. as passive victim or active agent; as residing within and/or outside 
Europe). Second, we attend to how these documents imagine the relationship between 
European governments and the conflict-affected woman on the move, particularly 
whether this relationship is based on political participation and/or protection – two 
central pillars of WPS. Third, we consider how the construction of both the conflict-
affected woman on the move and the national self either fixes or troubles conventional 
constructions of European identity and the imagined border between Europe and the rest 
of the world.  
Poststructuralist discourse analysis has often been used to expose the mutually 
constitutive and socially constructed character of hierarchical binaries that are otherwise 
taken for granted as common sense categories.62 We are particularly interested in the 
domestic/foreign binary, and how it connects to two other binaries: peaceful/violent, and 
 
62 Joan Wallach Scott, ‘Deconstructing equality-versus-difference: Or, the uses of post-structuralist 
theory for feminism’, Feminist Studies, 14:1 (1988), pp. 32-50, p.37. 
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gender-progressive/patriarchal.63 As we will show, these binaries structure Europe’s 
WPS policy in relation to forced displacement in a way that sustains unequal power 
structures of world politics. In a fashion typical of discourse analysis, we challenge their 
supposed fixity to explore alternative possibilities.64 In so doing, we draw inspiration 
from Anzaldúa’s call to cultivate mestiza consciousness, a border thinking that involves 
cultivating a tolerance for ambiguity through ‘a massive uprooting of dualistic thinking 
in the individual and collective consciousness’.65  
Logics of inclusion: Refugees as a domestic concern in Europe’s National Action 
Plans 
Our first and most important finding is that an important minority of European states do 
include the conflict-affected woman on the move within their WPS policy frameworks, 
and explicitly construct her as a subject of concern even after she leaves the war zone 
and journeys towards or within Europe. As many as nine European countries, or 41% of 
European countries with a NAP, include obligations regarding refugees who are within 
and at their borders in their WPS policy (see Figure 1). Some action plans emphasize the 
novelty of including refugee women in Europe within the remit of WPS and justify this 
change on the basis of the recent crises in the Mediterranean area. Thus, the government 
 
63 Similarly to Shepherd, ‘Making war safe’, p.332. 
64 See for example, Kunz and Maisenbacher, ‘Women in the neighbourhood’, p.125; Barkawi, 
‘Decolonising war’. 
65 Anzaldúa, Borderlands, p.102. 
29 
of Finland now considers that ‘the humanitarian catastrophe in Syria and the refugee 
crisis affecting Europe have made the themes discussed within the framework of Women, 
Peace and Security topical issues for European countries’, including in ‘sectors where 
domestic actors operate’.66  
 
The logics that underlie the inclusion of displaced women in Europe within the WPS 
policy of these nine countries pertain to two pillars of the WPS agenda: participation of 
 
66 Government of Finland, ‘NAP 2018-2021’, p.10; Government of Spain, ’II Plan nacional de acción de 
mujeres, paz y seguridad 2017-2023’, available at: 
{http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/es/SalaDePrensa/Multimedia/Publicaciones/Documents/2017_II%2
0PLAN%20NACIONAL%20ESP%20web.pdf} accessed 23 January 2020. 
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women in peace and security decision-making and protection from GBV. We start with 
participation. Some NAPs recommend the integration of women as border guards and 
other professionals attached to the reception of asylum seekers.67 The presence of women 
in these positions can contribute to a safer environment for women and girls asylum 
seekers, for instance in the conduct of body searches, health checks, or the provision of 
advice through helplines.68 The concern for participation also sometimes usefully 
extends to the inclusion of women asylum seekers in decision-making and policy review, 
whereas others articulate a broader concern to engage civil society organisations, 
particularly those representing the interests of refugee, migrant, and diaspora women.69 
This concern with the participation and empowerment of conflict-affected women living 
in Europe mirrors similar provisions for supporting women refugees in developing 
countries, for instance by enhancing their economic situation and furthering their 
participation in decision-making.70  
Participation is the area where a WPS approach allows for the most innovation in 
comparison to existing migration and refugee regimes. The aforementioned prescriptions 
in WPS policy exceed the protection-focused commitments of refugee law and asylum 
 
67 Government of Finland, ‘NAP 2018-2021’, p.40. 
68 Ines Keygnaert et al., Senperforto Frame of Reference for Prevention of SGBV in the European 
Reception and Asylum Sector (Ghent: Magelaan cvba, 2010); Angela Mackay, Border Management and 
Gender, ed. Megan Bastick and Kristin Valasek, Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit, (Geneva: 
DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR, UN-INSTRAW, 2008). 
69 Government of Germany, ‘NAP 2017-2020’, pp.17, 22. 
70 Government of Finland, ‘NAP 2018-2021’, pp.54-5. 
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regimes, as they also include a participatory dimension. Civil society organisations have 
been at the forefront of developing such a focus on the empowerment, inclusion, and 
consultation of refugee women in Europe. In Ireland, AkiDwA, an organization 
advocating on behalf of migrant women, lobbied for the inclusion of migrant women in 
Defence and Police Forces, funding for programmes that would connect diaspora women 
from armed conflict zones who now live in Ireland, and education opportunities.71 
Ireland’s NAP has taken some of these recommendations on board.72 This example 
demonstrates the possibility of policy frameworks seeing the conflict-affected woman on 
the move as not only a vulnerable person in need of protection, but also as an agentic 
actor in possession of relevant knowledge to inform policymaking.73 Such inclusion, in 
the NAPs of countries like Ireland and Germany,74 foresees collaborative deliberation 
with refugee women on their needs and priorities, and thereby creates possibilities for 
refugee women to participate in the formulation of policies which affect them.75 
 
71 AkiDwa, ’Ireland’s Second National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security’, available at: 
{http://akidwa.ie/irelands-second-national-action-plan-on-women-peace-and-security/} accessed 25 June 
2018. 
72 Government of Ireland, ’Ireland's Second National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, 2015-
2018’, available at: 
{http://www.peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/Revised%20NAP%20Ireland%20(2015-2018).pdf} 
accessed 23 January 2020. 
73 Shepherd, ‘Making war safe’, p.332. 
74 Government of Germany, ‘NAP 2017-2020’, pp.17, 22. 
75 This is echoes an understanding of ‘participation as deliberation’, already present in other aspects of 
the WPS agenda. Thomson, ‘The Women, Peace, and Security Agenda and Feminist Institutionalism: A 
Research Agenda’, p.604; see also Catherine O’Rourke, ‘“Walk[ing] the halls of power?” Understanding 
women’s participation in international peace and security’, Melbourne Journal of International Law, 
15:1 (2014), pp. 128-54.  
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European NAPs nonetheless remain more likely to invoke the need to protect refugee 
women and girls from GBV as a leading rationale for their inclusion within WPS policy. 
The NAPs identify different phases of the asylum process in which the needs and 
vulnerabilities of women and girls are to be considered, from the handling of asylum 
requests and the design of reception policies and infrastructures to resettlement and 
integration programmes. For example, the French NAP commits to increasing the 
‘consideration of issues linked to gender and violence against women in asylum 
procedures’.76 Belgium’s NAP details measures taken to ensure that women who seek 
asylum in Belgium benefit from gender-sensitive policies, including with regard to 
accommodation, health, and resettlement in Belgium.77 Some NAPs also outline 
measures related to staffing, such as gender training for professionals involved in service 
provision to asylum seekers.78 This emphasis on protection legitimately draws attention 
to the insecurity of asylum seekers at the borders of Europe.  
 
76 Government of France, ’France's second national action plan: Implementation of the United Nations 
Security Council 'Women, Peace and Security' resolutions 2015-2018’, available at: 
{http://peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/2014-2016%20WPS%20NAP%20France.pdf} accessed 5 
April 2017, p.20. 
77 Government of Belgium, ‘NAP 2013-2016’, p.7. 
78 Government of France, ‘NAP 2015-2018’, p.20; Government of Belgium, ‘NAP 2013-2016’, p.7; 
Government of the Czech Republic, ’The Action Plan of the Czech Republic to implement Security 
Council Resolution UN Security Council no. 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security and related 
resolutions for the years 2017 - 2020’, available at: {http://www.lse.ac.uk/women-peace-
security/assets/documents/2019/NAP/NAPCzech-Republic2017.pdf} accessed 23 January 2020, p.25. 
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We suggest, however, that the inclusion of refugees in WPS policy should emphasize 
both protection and participation of displaced women in decision-making. As feminists 
have pointed out, the exclusion of certain agents (in this case, refugees) from a space 
‘exposes the need for a power shift’, but inclusion is not always in and of itself sufficient 
to bring about such a power shift. Inclusion sometimes only allows ‘a partial 
renegotiation of the gendering and racing power’.79 In the case of WPS policy, an 
inclusion of refugee women that solely focuses on protection does not favor reciprocal 
relations between refugee women and European states. It repositions European states as 
protective heroes and conflict-affected women as helpless victims. For example, the 
Czech NAP stresses that women and girl migrants are among the most vulnerable groups, 
and therefore in need of special protection. This in turn calls for the state to take measures 
to prevent trafficking, GBV, and gender-based exclusion.80 Such measures are certainly 
necessary. However, a sole focus on protection at the expense of participation negates 
refugee women’s capacity and right to shape their own conditions of living and to 
participate in decision-making on security matters. It reproduces a common stereotype 
of suffering, helplessness, and oppression that negates the complex and diverse sets of 
 
79 Zillah Eisenstein, Sexual Decoys: Gender, Race and War in Imperial Democracy (London: Zed 
Books, 2007), p.94. 
80 Government of the Czech Republic, ‘NAP 2017-2020’, pp.21, 23, 25, 27, 28. 
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experiences, skills, and capacities of conflict-affected women on the move – a stereotype 
also often extended to LGBTQ refugees from Syria.81 
An inclusion of refugee women in WPS policy that solely emphasizes protection 
measures also problematically reasserts Europe’s position as the competent, willing, and 
heroic protector of both white and brown women.82 This framing obscures the 
responsibility or complicity of European states in creating some of the insecurity 
experienced by women and girl refugees in the first place.83 Most strikingly, none of the 
NAPs mention the well-established need to introduce and enforce codes of conduct to 
prevent sexual harassment and abuse by border guards and other security practitioners 
interacting with refugees, or ensure the functioning and integrity of complaints 
mechanisms designed to report such cases.84 While the Spanish NAP commits to enforce 
a zero-tolerance policy for sexual exploitation and abuse among security personnel 
deployed abroad, it curiously does not extend the scope of this policy to personnel 
working with asylum seekers at the domestic level.85 Nor did we find commitments to 
 
81 Fadi Saleh, ‘Queer/Humanitarian visibility: The emergence of the figure of the suffering Syrian gay 
refugee’, Middle East Critique, 29:1 (2020), pp. 47-67. 
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Management, p.9. 
85 Government of Spain, ‘NAP 2017-2023’, p.31. 
35 
revise legal frameworks on the situation of refugee women who hold visas based on their 
spouse’s refugee status, and whose ability to press charges against an abusive spouse is 
compromised by their fear of losing their right to remain in the host country.86  
Interestingly, Spain and Italy both recognize European society as a potential threat to 
refugees. The former mandates public information campaigns on refugee integration, and 
the latter requests the monitoring of hate crimes directed at women refugees.87 These 
policies thus recognize that refugee women and girls may sometimes face insecurity 
coming from within Europe. While these NAPs reposition European governments as 
protecting refugees against misguided elements of the host population, they productively 
trouble the assumption that violent threats against conflict-affected women emanate 
exclusively or primarily from outside Europe. The next section examines this 
assumption, which partly underlies some states’ decision to exclude the women forcibly 
displaced in Europe from their WPS framework.  
Logics of exclusion: Refugees as a foreign policy concern in Europe’s National 
Action Plans 
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In the majority of European action plans, refugee women in Europe or at its borders 
remain absent and invisible. Out of 22 NAPs in Europe, 13 remain silent on the violence 
experienced by forcibly displaced women in Europe, such as incarceration, sexual 
violence in refugee centres, and/or deportation back to the war zones that they have 
escaped. Similarly, the EU Action Plan does not address these policy failures and 
implementation gaps in domestic migration and asylum frameworks. The key rationale 
for omitting forced displacement in or near Europe from WPS policies is the idea that 
WPS is a foreign policy area. For example, successive iterations of the British NAP have 
specified: ‘this National Action Plan is focused overseas,’ and ‘the NAP is internationally 
focused’.88 During a consultation with academics in August 2017, UK government 
representatives reasserted this position: the NAP is a foreign policy document focused 
on ‘conflict-affected states’.89 The UK government has long supported the idea that the 
WPS framework has no domestic implication, including in Northern Ireland. This 
position contrasts with that of feminist academics and women’s rights activists, who 
understand Northern Ireland as a site of conflict, and one in which women continue to be 
sidelined despite their mobilisation for peace.90  
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The UK identifies refugees as a population of concern in ‘focus countries’ such as South 
Sudan, but not at home.91 Similarly, Denmark outlines ongoing support to an NGO 
working with Syrian refugees in Lebanon and Jordan, but no similar activities in 
Denmark itself.92 In total, 7 NAPs address forced displacement in the Global South only 
(see Figure 1). Likewise, the EU’s regional action plan highlights women’s forced 
displacement in places like Darfur but not in Europe itself.93 While pursuing this 
research, we have also met researchers and activists who considered that although the 
failures of the immigration and asylum regimes are alarming, it makes sense to address 
these through those existing frameworks, and preserve WPS as a foreign policy agenda.  
It is nonetheless necessary to interrogate the supposed naturalness of treating WPS as 
foreign policy, since like all things taken to be common sense it is a social construction 
made natural through habit. It is first worth noting that this is a distinctly European 
attitude. Outside of Europe, it is very common for questions of asylum, migration, and 
forced displacement to be included in WPS policy, including in relation to the domestic 
context. Globally, 76% of NAPs mention forced displacement, compared to only 68% in 
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European states (see Figure 2). Moreover, countries located outside of Europe more 
willingly address forced displacement as a domestic concern. Globally, 62% of NAPs 
mention refugees within, or at the borders of the host nation, compared to only 41% in 
Europe. Europe’s position is therefore, compared to global WPS policy, unusual and 
worth interrogating.  
FIGURE 2. VISIBILITY OF REFUGEES IN NAPS ON WPS 
 
We suggest that Europe’s greater tendency to treat WPS as foreign policy relies on and 
reproduces two problematic assumptions: that Europe is peaceful; and that Europe is 
gender-progressive. First, the framing of WPS as foreign policy, and thus not concerned 
with refugees close to home, is premised upon an understanding that WPS addresses 
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conflict, and that conflict is something that happens elsewhere, namely in the Global 
South. In Europe as more generally in the Global North, WPS policy often locates 
conflict outside of their national boundaries.94 This framing mirrors the Security Council 
Resolutions, which circumscribe attention to refugee women to those physically located 
in the geographic zones of conflict on its agenda. This notion of conflict zone, actively 
policed by the five permanent members, borrows from tropes cultivated in media and 
government discourse that construct the South as less modern, less developed, and less 
peaceful, and links the Global North to notions of peace and security.95 In other words, 
the borders of Europe generally do not appear to qualify as a conflict zone within WPS 
discourse because the latter is premised on a notion of conflict constructed by the 
permanent members of the Council to protect the sovereignty of Northern countries, 
particularly their own. It is largely as a result of such policing moves that the WPS agenda 
has imagined conflict-affected women as located in the South. This explains why only 
50% of NAPs produced in the Global North mention forced displacement as a domestic 
issue, against 72% in the South (see Figure 2). The WPS agenda borrows from a broader 
security-development discourse that imagines security problems to be located 
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exclusively in the South.96 In this discourse, Northern states and actors are imagined as 
exporting solutions. Thus, 71% of Northern NAPs construct forced displacement as a 
foreign policy issue, compared to only 17% of Southern NAPs. The problem, of course, 
is that such a framing obscures Northern responsibilities in fostering conditions of 
economic inequality, authoritarianism, and environmental degradation in the South, all 
of which fuel conflict on a global scale.97  
Second, European WPS policy has often been premised on the assumption that Europe 
is already performing gender-responsive protection, which makes European countries 
even less likely than the rest of the Global North to acknowledge the vulnerability of 
forcibly displaced women on their own territory. Indeed, although 50% of NAPs 
produced in the Global North consider forced displacement in the domestic context, this 
is only the case for 41% of European NAPs. As discussed earlier, European states see 
themselves as global leaders in the field of women’s rights.98 Their interventions frame 
gender-progressiveness as a normative ideal on the world stage, which is in many ways 
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beneficial, as is the transnational sharing of resources and successful practices to promote 
gender equality objectives. This conviction is to some extent well founded. The EU and 
(by extension) European countries have a robust policy framework addressing gendered 
concerns in forced migration. Since 2015, countries like Iceland, Latvia, Croatia, and 
Italy have also adopted new laws mandating gender-sensitive support for asylum-
seekers, gender training for security personnel working with refugees, and asylum 
procedures conducted by officials capable of assessing gender-specific forms of 
vulnerability.99 However, on the ground, the insecurity faced by conflict-affected women 
at the borders of Europe reminds us that severe shortcomings remain. In such a context, 
framing WPS as strictly foreign policy, and excluding the conflict-affected women on 
the move from its remit, is a construction that mainly serves to obscure European states’ 
failures to perform their idealized selves: the peace-loving protector of vulnerable 
women.   
Obscuring these failures is itself a way of hardening the borders by reproducing imagined 
distinctions between the European self and the Southern other. As Anzaldúa theorizes, 
borders are not simply geographic facts; they are socially produced and politically 
productive, in the sense that they are ‘set up to define places that are safe and unsafe, to 
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distinguish us from them’.100 Thus, the notion of Europe’s refugee ‘crisis’ does not only 
refer to the tragedy of lives violently uprooted and too often lost at sea, but also to the 
destabilisation of Europe’s security imaginary and sense of self.101 This imaginary 
locates Europeans as naturally at home in the North and inversely the populations of 
‘developing’ countries as belonging geographically in the South.102 The Southerner’s 
movements towards and into Europe are thus understood as ‘disorderly’ and threatening 
Europe with the violence, chaos, and underdevelopment associated with the South.103 
The framing of ‘crisis’, therefore, has served to justify the fortressing of Europe by 
(re)defining the latter as a space that is developed and civilized, and therefore cannot be 
home to people who are perceived as still in need of development and civilization.104  
In this context, a European WPS discourse that fails to address forced displacement, or 
addresses it only in the realm of foreign policy, is harmful and must be resisted, on the 
grounds that it contributes to the fortressing of Europe in two ways. First, it solidifies 
Europe’s sense of self as already at peace by obscuring the persisting gendered insecurity 
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experienced by those who flee the zone of conflict with the hope of finding asylum in 
Europe. As noted earlier, European states not only fail to meet women and girls’ needs 
at Europe’s borders, but often actively contribute to their insecurity by waging a war on 
immigration.105 European policy-makers who fail to acknowledge this gap are more 
likely to fall into the trap of using the WPS framework to reinforce an idealized view of 
Europe’s ‘own identity and sense of self’ as a gender-progressive community, while 
failing at making conflict-affected women a priority when policymakers feel it might 
harm ‘European interests’, as has been the case in the field of foreign policy.106 
Moreover, European actors may overlook lessons learned in non-European contexts of 
refugee protection that could be usefully applied in the handling of the refugee situation 
in Europe.107  
Second, the resulting preservation, in the shared European imaginary, of the heroic 
protector subjectivity ‘obscures the imbrication of such powerful actors in international 
capitalism and many of the political-economic asymmetries that produce displacement 
in the first place’.108 The failure to acknowledge Europe’s share of responsibility for the 
ill-fate of displaced women feeds variants of ‘femonationalism’: a tendency amongst 
some European feminists to cultivate the notion that ‘gender relations in the West are 
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more advanced and must be taught to Muslim women’, or more generally women from 
the developing world.109 Femonationalism cultivates unequal relationships in the 
international space. In the context of WPS, these beliefs often reinforce North/South 
hierarchies through the redeployment of colonial tropes of white protection of brown 
women from brown men first exposed by Gayatri Spivak.110 In addition, the imagination 
of Europe as a distinctively safe and gender-progressive space paradoxically legitimizes 
the fortressing of Europe against an outside imagined as unsafe and patriarchal, and thus 
fuels the war on immigration that maintains a growing number of women in a dangerous 
borderland.  
Conclusion: The limits of inclusion and the road ahead 
To summarise, we have shown that in nine European countries, WPS policy 
acknowledges the presence of conflict-affected women on the move at and within the 
borders of Europe. The emergence of the conflict-affected woman on the move to Europe 
in WPS policy and activism creates much needed entry points to better protect women 
forcibly displaced by conflict and, most innovatively, include them in decision-making 
processes. This emerging visibility of refugee women in WPS productively troubles the 
tendency of European states to self-present as always already reliably performing 
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peaceful and gender-responsive protection and inclusion. This problematic tendency 
remains visible in the WPS policy of thirteen European states and the EU, as they 
continue to omit the conflict-affected woman on the move from their WPS policy 
framework. This omission is enabled by the WPS framework itself, which demonstrably 
facilitates the reproduction of imperial hierarchies, the fortressing of Europe, and the 
neglect of refugee women’s human security. In this context, WPS activists and policy-
makers who recognise the existence of women forcibly displaced by conflict near Europe 
or within its borders productively trouble the imagined but de facto murky border 
between a gender-progressive, peaceful Europe and a patriarchal, conflict-ridden outside.  
This being said, we do not expect that the inclusion of refugee women within the WPS 
agenda would provide a panacea to the forms of insecurity they experience. Logics of 
inclusion meaningfully challenge, but also sometimes paradoxically reconsolidate, the 
fortressing and border-making effects of Europe’s WPS policy, as can be observed in 
European states’ tendency to position themselves as heroic protectors of vulnerable 
refugee women. The terms of inclusion, in other words, matter as much as inclusion in 
the first place. To go back to Suaad Allami, whose words opened this article, the 
protection of displaced women should be as important as their inclusion in policy-making 
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and in the identification of solutions addressing ‘the root causes of conflict and 
displacement’.111  
We hope that evolving connections between forced displacement and WPS will remain 
the object of scholarly attention, and close by suggesting avenues of further research that 
we have not had space to explore. First, we focus in priority on the EEA as the area 
constitutive of fortress Europe. While such a classification has been necessary as a first 
step, we see potential in developing more carefully contextually informed accounts of 
how the silence around refugee questions is both maintained and challenged in different 
countries both within and beyond the EEA. Second, we have focused here on the figure 
of the conflict-affected woman. We are nonetheless wholly sympathetic to attempts to 
re-orient the focus of the agenda from women to gender, thereby allowing consideration 
of the gendered experiences of men and boys, as well as sexual and gender minorities.112 
We therefore identify possibilities for future research exploring in greater depth the 
intersections between gender, sexuality, race, and forms of insecurity experienced by 
refugees. Finally, our efforts to push the WPS community towards attention to refugee 
questions occur in the context of the emergent inclusion of a counter-terrorism mandate 
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in the WPS agenda. The militarising potential of such developments is concerning, 
especially in view of a predominant, politically motivated, conflation of the figures of 
the asylum seeker and the international terrorist.113 We therefore identify the need for 
continued vigilance for on what terms, and with what effects for the security and 
empowerment of women, refugee questions are taken up in the WPS agenda. It is crucial 
that these concerns are founded in a commitment to refugee women’s right to asylum 
and political participation, rather than counter-terrorism. 
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